Chris & Partners Advocates & Solicitors

Half-truths in a condo WhatsApp group: the Federal Court’s warning

A single message sent to a WhatsApp group of condominium owners in August 2017 ended, almost seven years later, in the Federal Court. On 5 June 2024, in Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong, the court confirmed that a message built from literally true facts can still be defamatory if the sender knowingly leaves out the fact that would have cleared the person named. Anyone who is active in residents’, parents’ or community chat groups has reason to understand the decision.

A developer dispute spills into the owners’ chat

The appellant owned a unit in the Waldorf & Windsor Tower serviced apartments and sat on an owners’ committee that was in dispute with the developer. The respondent was the developer’s founder and chairman.

On 17 August 2017 the appellant sent a message to a WhatsApp group of unit owners and their representatives. The group had 56 members, including the sender. In general terms, the message referred to criminal charges once brought against members of the respondent’s family, stated that the respondent himself had been arrested and charged about twenty years earlier, and invited members to look the names up online.

What the message left out was that the respondent had been acquitted in the 1990s. The courts found that the appellant knew this.

The High Court dismissed the respondent’s defamation claim. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, awarded RM100,000 in damages and granted a permanent injunction. The appellant then took the case to the Federal Court.

The questions that reached Putrajaya

According to the law-report headnote, two questions of law were before the Federal Court. The first was whether Malaysian courts may draw on foreign common-law authorities about half-truths, given section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956, which governs the reception of English common law. The second was whether sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, which deal with justification and fair comment, already cover the ground.

Some terms need explaining. Justification is the defence that the defamatory meaning of the words, often called the sting, is true. Fair comment protects honest opinion on a matter of public interest that is based on true facts. Qualified privilege protects statements made between people who share a genuine common interest in the subject, as long as the maker is not acting with malice.

True in parts, misleading as a whole

A panel of Hasnah Mohammed Hashim, Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal and Nordin Hassan FCJJ dismissed the appeal. The RM100,000 award and the permanent injunction ordered by the Court of Appeal were affirmed.

The court held that a statement made up of literally true facts can still be defamatory, and cannot be justified, if a material fact that would exonerate the person is knowingly left out so that the whole conveys a false impression. The sting of the message was that the respondent shared in the dishonesty that the message attributed to a family member. Mentioning the acquittal would have removed that sting. Telling readers to check for themselves did not neutralise it. The deliberate omission was also evidence of malice, which defeated the defences of qualified privilege and fair comment.

As a decision of the apex court, the ruling is final.

What the decision means for group chats

First, a closed chat group is publication. In law, communication to one person other than the person defamed is enough; 55 fellow owners is far more than that.

Second, truth is a defence only to the whole sting. A person who mentions an arrest must mention the acquittal. A person who mentions a complaint should mention that it was dismissed.

Third, disclaimers do little. Adding that one is only sharing, that readers should verify for themselves, or that one is not sure whether the story is true, is not a defence.

Fourth, committee members are not left unprotected. Office-bearers of joint management bodies and management corporations, parent-teacher associations or surau and temple committees who communicate on a matter of genuine common interest may be able to rely on qualified privilege. Malice destroys the privilege, however, and knowingly leaving out the other half of the story was treated as evidence of malice here.

The position of group administrators is less clear. We are not aware of any Malaysian appellate decision holding an administrator liable merely for holding that role. Two things nevertheless point towards risk once an administrator knows of a defamatory message and does nothing. One is section 114A(1) of the Evidence Act 1950, which presumes that a person named as the administrator of a publication published it unless the contrary is proved. The other is GS Realty Sdn Bhd v Lee Kong Seng, in which the High Court held a Facebook page owner liable for third-party comments that he knew of and left up. This is commentary, not settled law.

Practical takeaways for residents, committees and group admins

  • Treat every group message as something that may be read out in court. Screenshots travel, and a message sent to a closed group is often the main exhibit at trial.
  • Tell the whole story or do not tell it. If you know of an acquittal, a withdrawal or a dismissal, include it.
  • Do not rely on phrases such as just sharing or please verify. They do not shift responsibility to the reader.
  • Committee members should keep messages to the matter of common interest and avoid personal attacks on individuals.
  • Group admins should set group rules, delete offending messages promptly, remove repeat offenders and keep a record of what was done and when.
  • If you are the person targeted, save the message, its date and the list of group members before anything is deleted.

Authorities and sources

  • Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong [2024] 5 MLRA 68; [2024] 4 MLJ 260 (Federal Court, 5 June 2024)
  • Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong v Seema Elizabeth Isoy [2023] 3 MLJ 674 (Court of Appeal)
  • GS Realty Sdn Bhd v Lee Kong Seng [2018] MLJU 1902 (High Court)
  • Defamation Act 1957, sections 8 and 9; Civil Law Act 1956, section 3; Evidence Act 1950, section 114A(1)
  • Stewart Manley, case note on the decision in Legal Studies (Cambridge University Press), published online 5 March 2026
  • Published case commentaries on the decision by Malaysian law firms

This article is general legal information only and is current as at 19 September 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create a solicitor-client relationship. Court decisions may be appealed and the law may change; please seek advice on your own circumstances. — Chris & Partners, Advocates & Solicitors

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